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Abstract 
Physical protection is a necessity in all military operations re gardless of purpose. I t is 
thereby always a part of the operation and the demand will giv e an operational effect. 
The author's personal experience has led to a realization that a solution for temporat-y 
physical protection is missing. Herein presents a solution for filling this gap. The 
solution is named Quick Response Cell System (QRCS). The main construction idea 
for the QRCS is easiest described as an accordion-like assembly of sewed tagether 
open cells in plastic fibre cloth. Futthennare the QRCS has been validated with full 
scale live testing of common threats. QRCS - instead of nothing! 
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Sammanfattning 
Bakgrund 
Idag saknas det en funktionslösning för tillfälligt fysiskt skydd för personal och 
utmstning i militära internationella operationer som uppfyller krav på fältmässighet 
och god tillgänglighet samtidigt som den är lätt, billig och snabb. 
Fysiskt skydd används för att minimera effekterna på objekt och/eller mätmiska från 
ett eller flera verkställda hot. Det kan också verka förebyggande och avskräckande. 
Avgörande för val av funktionslösning är vilka hot som föreligger och vilket skydd 
som skall uppnås. Andra faktorer som påverkar valet är: möjlig tidsåtgång för 
upprättande av skydd, personaltillgång (utbildningsnivå och numerär), material och 
utmstning till förfogande samt väder och klimat . 
Vidare är effektiv logistik nödvändig då transportsätten, vare sig det är på land, på 
havet eller via luften, bara medger en begränsad mängd volym och vikt per tillfåll e. 
Detta gäller det att optimera. Till exempel tar ett av världens mest använda militära 
transpmiflygplan enbart två 20-fots containrar i sitt lastutrymme. 
Ä ven ekonomin för en fysisk skyddsprodukt måste beaktas. Viktiga nyckeltal är 
kostnad per skyddsenhet, kostnaden för vatje transpOlierad vikt- och volymenhet 
samt livscykelkostnad. 
Examensarbetet behandlar endast hot gällande ballistik, splitter och ttyckvåg. 
Dagens använda skyddskonstruktioner 
Idag används flera olika systemlösningar för att uppnå fysiskt skydd: uppskottade 
jordvallar, sandsäckar, murkonstmktioner av betong eller befintliga murar i material 
såsom tegel eller lera eller kraftiga sammanlänkade stålnätskorgar invändigt klädda 
med en geotextilduk. Befintliga byggnader tas stundtals i besittning. 
Ide 
Examensarbetets ger förslag på en kompletterande funktionslösning för fysiskt skydd. 
Lösningen är benämnd Quick Response Cell System (QRCS). Detta är ett system av 
sammansydda öppna celler, likt ett dragspel hänger de sanu11an och öppnas upp när 
man drar ut dem. QRCS är tillverkat av en plastfiberväv. Cellema kan vara av olika 
storlekar. De kan vara självstagande eller vikbara. 
vii 
QRCS är inte i sig det som utgör skyddet. Vad QRCS skapar och utgör är en modem 
behållare för de naturliga material (gms, jord, med mera) som utgör skyddet som 
sådant. De naturliga materialens skyddsnivå är sedan tidigare dokumenterad. 
Plastfibervävens anpassningsbarhet ger mycket goda möjligheter till ett 
situationsanpassat skydd. Den låga vikten och den låga volymen gör dessutom att 
QRCS kan tas med i stön·e mängd och utsträckning än vad som praktiskt kan göras 
med dagens använda produkter. Däm1ed kan fysiskt skydd skapas tidigare och oftare. 
Vidare kräver QRCS väldigt kort utbildning. En organisations behov att avsätta tid 
och ekonomiska medel för att upprätthålla en god kunskapsnivå är därav låg vilket 
ger att många fler kan utbildas och nyttja skyddslösningen. Dessutom, vid en framtida 
avveckling och återställande, är QRCS i sig själv lätt att riva och vid en deshuktian 
miljövänlig; restprodukterna blir vatten och koldioxid. 
Fälttest 
Fälttest har genomförts i två steg. Först provades hanterbarbeten för personal och 
QRCSs uppträdande vid fyllning med maskin genom olika murkonstmktioner. 
Därefter genomfördes destmktionstest på dessa för att undersöka skyddsnivån vid ett 
antal typfall av troliga hot . 
Resultat och analys 
QRCS håller ihop när den fylls med natunnaterial. QRCS går att stapla på varandra. 
QRCS håller för samtliga vapenhot som användes under testen. Natum1aterialet 
sta1mar kvar i cellerna, även om dessa får mindre eller något stöiTe skador. QRCS 
som ballistiskt skydd och skydd mot mindre luftstötvåg fungerar därmed. Den låga 
vikten gör QRCS enkel att hantera och den låga transportvolymen gör att mycket av 
QRCS går att få med även i mindre fordon. Under fyllning bör fyllnivån hållas jämn i 
cellema och cellerna bör fyllas något långsamt för bästa resultat. 
Framtiden 
Hanterbarbeten bör undersökas ytterligare med tmppförsök där militära förband 
bygger olika konstmktioner av QRCS. Därefter bör fullskaleförsök genomföras med 
fler typer av ammunition mot QRCS. 
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1 lntroduction 
Physical protection is a necessity in all military operations regardless of purpose. 
When participating in operations for the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) based upon 
mandates by United Nations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the author have seen, 
worked with, lived within and built different kinds ofphysical protection solutions. 
This experience has led to a realization that a solution for tempm·aty physical 
protection is missing. This Master thesis will explore the apportunities for a solution 
and give a suggestion for filling this gap. 
Furthem1ore, operations conducted abroad especially put stress on logistics. Many 
areas of operations are bard to reach. Airlift is often the only remaining realistic 
alternative for a successful operation. Not only is this expensive, campared to other 
means oftransportation, but it also limits the capacity ofpossible volume and weight. 
A plane can carry fewer loads than for instance a ship. Therefore is it advantageous if 
eve1y kilogram and cubic metre are used as efficiently as possible. 
Finally, there is the economical aspect ofphysical protection conceming fiscal 
matters and regarding time consumptian for deployment. Required knowledge and 
necessary equipment are other important elements in a system for the end-user. 
Physical protection solutions in u se today miss out in som e of the above-mentioned 
parameters due to the fact that they are for example heavy, space-demanding, 
machines are a necessity, time consuming or requires a Iot ofknowledge. 
This Master thesis presents a solution named Quick Response Cell System, QRCS. 
1.1 Objective 
To develop a new product for temporary physical protection solution. 
1.2Aim 
To document, controland belay that the product is sustainable and suitable. 
1.3 Background 
The author's militaty experience from being an officer in the reserve in the anny in 
the SAF and service abroad has given an insight in different working methods and 
pbysical protection solutions in use. The service has been principally within the 
engineering branch . 
During the author's tour in Kosovo the task was explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). 
The first tour in Kabul and Afghanistan was as a project engineer within the civil 
military cooperation (CIMIC) coordination centre (CC) i.e. teclmical adviser and 
manager for civil engineering projects. The seeond tum was as chief (C) multi 
national (MN) EOD CC in Kabul. 
The origin for more systematic thoughts startedwith a big bomb. In summer of2005 
a big unexploded air bomb was found at Kabul Intemational airport (KAlA). This had 
to be disposed. The EOD team at KAlA was given the task. Du e to the location of the 
bomb (at the main and only airport that needed to be open and affected the shortest 
time possible) and the size ofit, huge protection measures were necessary. It was 
built a vast physical protection constmction ofHESCO Bastions (HB), which was the 
only way at hand to solve the situation. HB is a modem gabion system. Unfortunately 
HB is costly and for a one-occasion constmction that afterwards is demolished and 
thrown away it is an expansive solution. This was an eye-opener. 
The third tour in Afghanistan was as Second in Conu11and (2IC) Chief Engineering 
Officer (CEO) at the Swedish camp constmction in the city of Mazar-e-Sharif in the 
northem part of the country. Once the constmction work started on the land Sweden 
was given for the new camp i t bad to be protected. A small guard unit was deployed 
to the site. Its mission was to surveil , guard and proteet the si te itself, the installations 
and erected constmctions, equipment and (building) materials and other military 
persoru1el as weil as the local workers. A small pre camp was established in situ. No 
physical protection in the begitming, not even visual coverage was possible to 
accompli sh due to lack of equipment as weil as appropriate material. 
Back in Sweden, visible on constmctions sites, there were big bags in a plastic 
material being used for recycling building material. And so one late evening in 
November in 2005 in the tent on the bed, inside the mosquitoes net the thought came: 
what if you take the plastic material and make a constmction ofbig open cells that are 
linked tagether like a accordion? Light weight, small volume, easy to use, wear and 
tear and cheap? 
The idea was bom. 
2 
2 Method 
2.1 Working methods 
The methods that have been used are theoretical studies, field studies i.e. interviews 
and field-test. A literature investigation has been conducted. Furthennore, 
presentations of the idea with feedback have been made. Produc t deve!opment too k 
initially place thru brainstonning. The final manufacturing development was done 
tagether with the manufacturing company. Full-seale testing was finally executed. 
2.2 Limitations 
There are two main possible ways to conduct the study and field test: 
The first option is to look into several different constructions and their use of 
different materials. To these your own idea is added and the tests can be run 
paralle l. The outcome will be a comparative result of how the different 
solutions handie the strains put onthem relatively. With a small budget and 
timescale, s u ch as a student conducting his final thesis, the range of the test ed 
products gives little possibility for a thorough investigation; the shallowness 
risks i t to become meaningless. 
The altemative option is to use one material and one (main) construction 
idea. This concentration to a naiTower field of test ed products will allo w a 
small but in depth investigation. The results will be more significant, but of 
course solely, to the one construction and/or material tested. This approach 
will be manageable with the get-at-able amount of time that i t is within the 
Master thesis. The latter was chosen. 
Limitations regarding the destruction test itself (that will be practical operable) are 
dete1mined by a number of parameters : probable threats to the physical protection 
construction, number and kind of prototypes, available testing si te (safety regulations , 
allowance of weight of explosive, calibre of ammunition and distances between 
explosive and prototype, etc) , available working force to cany out the test and 
available equipment to stage the testing. 
The Master thesis will be discussi.ng and covering conventional threats and some 
modem non-lethai as weil as Jethal unconventional threats. Threats from them1o 
baric, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and systems are excluded. The 
protection measurements required withstanding an attack from these threats are 
outside the purpose with the QRCS . 
3 
4 
3Threats 
3.1 lntroduction 
The purpose with physical protection is to counteract, prevent and mi tiga te the effects 
on personneJ and/or equipment of one or more executed tlu·eats. Furthem1ore shalJ the 
physical protection make it more difficult to cause damage. 
Earlieron has the tenn threats been used conceptualJy. This chapter wiJJ look into the 
actual threats , which are the threats and what they are made up of. The metl1ods of 
eausing damage despite the type of threats, can be divided as follows 
Fig. l Threats eaused by different weapon system 
Principium De facto Variations 
Penetration Projectiles SmalJ-bare 
Medium-bare 
Big-bore 
Fragmentation NaturalJy fragmented 
Prefragmented or directed 
Shaped charge 
Pressure Air shock-wave 
Ground shock-wave 
Direct contact 
Combinations 
The difference lies in the way the metl1ods are carried out against the object or person 
with intent to injure between the threats. The actual threats are presented below to 
give the reader an understanding of how the different threats can vary. 
In a modem operational theatre, in amendment to the conventional threats, the 
physical protection solutions must also withstand non-Jethal and Jethal 
unconventional threats. 
3.2 Conventional threats 
3.2.1 Direct fire 
Direct fire means aiming through a sight directly at the target, for example firing with 
a pistol or an automatic weapon such as the world infamous Russian AK-47. The 
weapons could also have larger caJiber such as a Heavy Macl1ine Gun (HMG). 
The weapons shot away a smaJJ projectile that is the actual threat. The bullet and the 
kinetic energy it delivers damages, destroys or neutralizes its target The bulJet is 
normally of homogenous meta l. 
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Fig. 2 The iconic infamous AK-47 
3.2.2 lndirect fire 
Indirect fire means that aiming does not rely on directly viewing the target through 
the sights. The weapon system is airned with precalculated or given coordinates of the 
location of the target, which the weapon platform is elevated after in x- , y- and z-
direction, hence the 'aiming' is indirect. 
With traditional indirect fire , the trajectory of the projectile cannot be altered once it 
has been fired. However, some modem projectiles with a guidance system operate 
mo re fi·eely and can make smaller ad justment depending on the location of the target 
The weapon systems opera te from a fe w hundreds of meters up till tens of kilometers. 
With even lm·ger weapon system, like missiles , the range is literally around the earth. 
Indirect fire is mostly executed with mm·tars , canons, howitzers or rocket a11illery. 
Fig. 3 Example ofhowitzer Fig. 4 Example of mortar system 
The projectiles weigh fi·om part of a kilogram up to several kilograms and with lm·ger 
system the weight reaches hundreds of kilos (missiles). The projectiles in general 
consist of a bard jacket filled with explosives. It explodes either in the air above the 
target or at impact. The jacket becomes shrapnel that even more damage the target. 
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3.2.3 Fragmentation 
Fragmentation is the process by which the casing of an artillery shell , bomb, grenade, 
etc is shattered by the detonating high explosive (HE) filling . The detonation could be 
at impact or at a preset timeframe (for example at NN seconds). The fragments can 
als o be prefonned and of various shapes and sizes. The resulting high velacity 
fragments produced by either method are the main lethality threats of these weapons. 
The dam a ges on the target are als o eaused by items w h ich were not part of the 
original explosive device (primmy), but which are propelledas projectiles by the 
force of the explosive or impact (secondmy). The w ord shrapnel is often used to 
describe these fragments. 
Fig. 5 Different types of fragments and shrapnel. 
3.2.4 Shaped charge 
To gain increased effect of an charge, in order for instance to penetrate protection out 
of mmour, the charge can be shaped like the picture below which will focus the effect 
of the explosive's energy. The shaped charge is a concave meta! con e in front of high 
explosive, all generally in a meta! casing. When the high explosive is detonated, the 
meta! cone is campressed and squeezed forward and the explosive fom1s a jet which 
could go up to several kilometers per second. 
Fig. 6 Princip le of a shaped charge 
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3.2.5 Shock wave 
Detonation is a process of combustion with supersonic speed. In the front of the 
explosion a shock wave is established and the high pressm·e that is generated destroys 
the target The energy of a sh ock wave decreases relatively quickly with distance i.e. 
even on short distance away from the detonation there are little damages . 
Fig. 7 The 1995 bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building, USA 
3.3 Unconventional threats 
3.3.1 Non-lethai 
3.3 .1.1 Visual view 
Visual view or the possibility to spy visually, from outside the perimeter and/or inside 
the compound is a non-lethai (at the implementation) threat with the aim to gain 
knowledge over your opponent (i.e. us) that will improve the effect off and facil i ta te 
hostile actions . 
3.3.1.2 People as such 
A body ofpeople whether it is a spontaneous gathering, a demonstration or a platmed 
and disguised misdirection is always a potential threat. Even if the intention is 
otherwise, the situation can go on the rocks and become uncontrollable for all and 
everyone. Panic and public disorder with risk for injuries and damages not only on 
the involved crowd and on own personneJ and equipment and installations but also on 
the local citizens in the close surmundings and their passessions as a result. 
The purpose could of course be to actually cause destruction or abduction of 
equipment and teclmical installations, to conceal assassins or to deny entrance/exit 
to/from the compound. Bu t also to bring about situations of handgrip to be ab le to 
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hurt and abduct own personnel. Despite the intent, the actions will tie considerable 
part of own personnel as a consequence. 
3.3.2 Lethal 
3.3.2.1 Suicide attack 
A suicide attack is an attack in which an attacker - either an individual or a group-
intends to kill othersand knows he or she will (most likely) die . Suicide attacking 
includes suicide bombing as well as martyrdom operations. 
Contemporary suicide attacks almost always involve explosive materials such as a 
bomb, and are often carried out with the help ofvehicles. A suicide bomber with a 
handheld bomb, often carriedas a vest, is possible to bring 10-15kg of explosive with 
him . With a vehicle (a ear) it increases to 400-600 kg. With larger vehicles the load 
can increase tenfold. 
3.3.2.2 lmprovised explosive device 
An improvised explosive device (lED) is a bomb constructed, and fabricated and 
deployed in ways other than conventional anmmnition in militaty use. An lED could 
consist of high explosive, splinters, pyrotechnics and/or toxic chemicals. lts ma in 
purpose is to damage and destroy equipment and injmy and kill hw11ans, either 
militaty personnel or civilians as a tenor weapon. An lED typically consists of an 
explosive charge, a detonator, and an initiation system. lEDs are extremelydiverse in 
design. lEDs are triggered by various methods, including remote control , inft·ared or 
magnetic triggers , pressme-sensitive bars or trip wires. 
A vehicle bome lED, or VBlED, is a militaty term for a ear bomb or truck bomb. 
These are typically employed by suicide bombers, and can cany a relatively !arge 
charge as mentioned above. They can also be detonated from a remote location. 
VB lEDs can create additional shrapnel through the destruction of the vehicle itself, as 
well as using vehicle fuel as pati of the system. 
3.3 .2.3 Heat and fire 
Heat and fire can be used as a weapon that the physical protection has to withstand 
for a shorter or a longer period, depending on the weapon system in use. The heat and 
fire can be launched in almost immmerable ways. The well-lmown Molotov cocktail 
and the flamethrower, a weapon designed to project a Iong controllable stream of fire, 
are to examples. The wished-for effect is the same; to create destruction thru difficult 
extinguishable fire . The heat itselfwill furthermore affect heat-sensitive equipment 
and persmmel outside the actual zon e of fire. 
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4 Physical protection solutions 
4.1 lntroduction 
A deployed military force to an operational theatre needs a secure and safe physical 
location for own personneJ and equipment from where they can operate. To create 
such a safe hub is it necessary with physical protection constructions. A camp, easiest 
described as a fortified small town, serves that purpose. 
4.2 Protection theory 
Physical protection solutions worldwide consist of man y diverse constructions and/or 
different materials within the wholerange from pem1anent to temporary solutions. 
There are different protection solutions to different threats. Some protection 
measurements proteet against several threats , for example a thick wall for ballistic 
protection also serves the purpose of denying the possibility of visual observation. 
Ballistic protection can be reacl1ed in many ways, but they are all based upon four 
basic principles, which are protection thru masses , geometry, material or distance. 
Two of theses principles, masses and material, are ways of building metl1ods that 
could be used to achieve protective constructions dimensioned to withstand the 
"nom1al" threat level that occurs in the different operational theatres. The first idea is 
to use the massiveness of a construction to create protection. The other idea is to use 
the strength and hardness of a material. The first could be an embankment, the later a 
wall of annoured steel. 
The required thickness is depending on the materiel in use 1• Some example in order 
to give an understanding, mmour-piercing small anns and/or discarding-sabot 
ammunition can though penetrate, the equivalent thicknesses are 
Thickness (mm) Materiel 
10 steel 
200 concrete 
250 grave l 
250 brick wall 
500 sandbags 
700 t im ber 
700 packed soil 
1500 block ofice 
2000 peat soil 
2000 packedsnow 
l soldaten i falt , page 78, 200 l 
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For physical protection at camp constructions is i t strived for the method of masses 
and thereby taking advantage of the natural earth deposits and rock types in s itu. All 
of the presented ballistic protection solutions are based on this principle. With or 
without som e kind of packaging to fonn the masses in desirably shape and size. 
These physical protection solutions described below are either used by the author or 
of him experienced in the operational theatres in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Chad. 
4.3 Unauthorized access protection 
4.3.1 Mesh net with or without insight protecting cloth 
Mesh net or more precise chain !ink fences serves two functions , outer and i1mer. The 
outer as a peripherally application as the, or a part of, the physical perimeter 
protection. The inner function is on the camp as a zone divider for sectioning. 
A camp acconm1odates many functions and units. For physical safety some minor 
areas are usual cordon off, around ante1mas or the power plant for instance. The main 
part of the work are open i.e. publicwhereasa smaller part of the work and units due 
to their kind or activities are secret and needs to be protected from unauthorized 
persons and access controlied and limited to pers01mel with jo b requirements on! y. A 
too! for zone separation is a mesh net with insight protecting cloth. 
Fig. 8 Mesh net with insight protecting cloth 
4.3.2 Plank 
Plank is mostly of steel, often conugated. Variations in shape, size, material etcetera 
exists infinity. The possible use is similar to mesh net (see above) . 
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4.3.3 Barbed wire and corresponsive 
Barbed wire is a type offencing wire constmcted with sharp edges or points arnnged 
at intet-valsalongthe strand(s). A person trying to pass through or over barbed wire 
will suffer discomfort and possibly injury. Most barbed wire fences, while sufficient 
to discourage cattle, are passable by humans who can simply climb over the fence or 
through the fence by stretching the gaps between the wires using non-barbed seetians 
of the wire as hand holds . An often-used solution is to place a few strands of barbed 
wire at the top of a chain !ink fence . 
To prevent humans crossing, many prisans and high-security installations constmct 
fences with razor wire, a variant that is a mesh of meta! strips with sharp ed ges, 
instead of the barbs, that almost create near-continuous cutting surfaces sufficient to 
injure unprotected persons who climb on or over it. Concettina wire is a type ofrazor 
wire that is fotmed in !arge coils, which can be expanded like a concertina. 
,.. . 
• 
. 
>._, 
. ' t , • 
. l . 
. ' 
• l 
Fig. 9 Cancertina on to p of a fence 
4.3.4 Vehicle barriers 
....,._, 
Prevention from unauthorized vehicles access along the perimeter, a ear or a tmck, 
could be executed with ditches or wire. Protective wire system could be very similar 
to the wire system along the Swedish national road network. Ditches exist in many 
shapes and sizes. It is imp01tant to be aware that inappropriate design could give a 
speeding vehicle the possibility to drive straight overit and not be stopped. A ditch 
has to be wide enough and deep to intervene such actions , which is best handled with 
a dit ch that has a gradient of the ou ter side so the vehicle is forced to go down in to 
the ditch. The inner side should then have a much steeper gradient in order to stop the 
vehicle completely, please see fig. 15 below. Fmthennore must the ditch has weather-
resistance i.e. been built to withstand rain. 
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4.4 Existing ballistic protection solutions 
4.4.1 Wall 
There are three ma in ways of achieving a wall or mo re precise in this context, a 
vertical physical protective construction: using existing constmctions, a new 
construction erected either by the own organization or under supervision an extemal 
company or a combination of both ex is ting and new additions. 
Existing wall s can consist of a variety of structural solutions and building materials 
such as brick, clay, stone and concrete. It can even be remains ofhouses etc. The use 
of existing wall s gives a low-cost, time sa ving protection with exiguous needs of own 
work and equipment. It can be taking in active use promptly. 
The disadvantages arethat the quality and protective capability are unknown. 
Furthem10re could the construction be bobby trapped and/or parti y constmcted of or 
by accident have unexploded ordnance (UXO) in it (rectangular UXOs have been 
found to work as beams at window openings) . The wall could also be wiretapped and 
sanitarily hazardous to use. 
An execution of construction under one's own auspices gives contro l over how the 
construction is executed and the leve l of protection will be an exact knowledge. The 
protection can be tailor-made to meet the needs. Wall constmctions are mostly done 
in concrete with or without in addendum extra absorbing masses. An example of the 
fonner is in use or has been used on Nortl1em Ireland by the British am1ed forces. It 
is a construction with double concrete walls with an intennediate part of filllooking 
as a ve1tical sandwich in cross section. An example of the later are the T -w alls in use 
in Kosovo at the Swedish camp Victoria, which best can be described as an upside-
down T, in cross section they look like: 1_ , 
The concrete wall , is however a time consuming, high-cost solution. It demands a 
high leve! of education of persmmel and training of functional units. The constmction 
also needs particular building material such as cement, fresh water, reinforcement 
bars , moulds and special equipment and machines. Material and materiel (i.e. heavy 
weight and huge volumes) must be freighted to the building site in the operational 
theatre. An altemative is to buy or hire locally but it could be bard to find or ofpoor 
and unsuitable quality. Furthennore must the organisation have weil educated 
specialists that are available at the given time fram e of the work. The building project 
will also be vulnerable to uncontrolled inteiTUpied deliveries . 
A combination where the existing walls are complemented with new walls is a third 
altemative and a middle course. Bu t could be an uncertainty of how the two 
components interact with each other. 
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4.4.2 HESCO Bastion2 
In the 1991 Persian Gul f War a new physical protective solution was introduced, the 
HESCO Bastion Concertainer® (HB). The solution become widespread in the 1990s 
duringa number ofmilita1y interventions from the international society on the 
Balkans due to the civil wars and wars that tragically occurred across the southeast 
Europe. The HB has ever since been used in all international operational theatres. 
The system is a British invention. I t is a prefabricated, multi-cellular system of 
gabions, made of galvanized steel weld mesh and lil1ed with non-woven 
polypropylene geotextile. The gabions are stackable (please see pictures). 
Fig. l O HESCO Bastions as a perimeter protection wall 
Fig. 11 Shelter built ofHESCO Bastions 
2 
www.hescobastion.com 
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It is delivered flat-packed on standard pallets. U nits can be extended and joined using 
the provided joining pins. The cells are produced in nine different sizes. It can be 
filled both by hand and/or by machines , which will give a most effective building 
process. The number of required persmmel and the amount of time would be hel d at 
minimum in that way. 
Almost all kinds of natural materials can be used as fillin g mass. The system itself 
and the many sizes enable a who le range of constructions, besides the i1mumerable 
wall types that are possible, such as ammunition compound, bunkers, observation 
points , guard posts and many more. The HESCO Bastions are strong and have a very 
good resistance, with a con·ect filling, against tirreats as /inldirect fire , fragments and 
shock waves. 
The HESCO Bastion system depends on mechanical handling. To be able to use the 
full potential in the systemmachines are a necessity. Both for transpartatian and 
filling . The units, four or more united cells , due to their weight are not suitable for a 
rational building process if handie by hand regarding transpmtation. The normal 
individual unit for wall constructions has the dimensions as flat packed when 
transported: H 250 x W 1070 x L 1370 mm and weighs 156 kg. With the volume of 
masses that are required machinery filling is a necessity. 
The HESCO Bastion system is costly. The above-mentioned unit, that build 10 
metres of wall , east around 5000 SEK3, i.e. 500 SEK per metre. A nom1al wall 
consists of at !east in cross seetian two units in width at the base and a single on top. 
To gain height (four metres is preferable) the options are either to p ut a smaller unit 
on top directly (less than four metres) or more solid is to build with two in width at 
the base, then another two and finally one single on top. With a cross seetian offive 
units the price per metre is 2500 SEK. Then i t is only to multiply with the length of 
the perimeter to get the total east. 
For same short-tenn activities as for instance mine clearing in urban areas the HB is 
too good. This will mean that the protection in the end becomes more expensive than 
necessary. HB is made to last. For years if treated right (for UV -light protection the 
HB could be covered in a thin plaster of cement). They could be emptied bu t i t is a 
very time consuming work if the intention is to be to use the HB aga in. A faster 
emptying method is with the hel p of machines , bu t this will most like ly res u l t in !arge 
quautities ofwaste material that is bard to dispose and take away. The ripped apart 
HB f mm a small bill of mesh n et and geotextile mixed with filling material. 
3 Interview with Mr Angl evik, 2007 
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Protective measurement is a part of the standing operating proeecture (SOP) of 
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). If i t is decided that the munitions have to be 
destroyed in situ, this requires physical protection of the surroundings. With larger 
object, UXO as missiles , bigger air bombs, the protective construction becomes huge, 
costly, as we!!. It is overkill to use the HESCO Bastion, but with no real practical 
alternative, it is the one altemative that remains. 
4.4.3 Sandbags 
Sandbags are as the name implicate, a bag filled with sand or similarly natural 
material. The protective concept uses the stackable a bility of the sandbags to create a 
physical barrier that almost can assume any fo1m likable. 
P lastic and jute sack fabrics are the two most common materials for the 
manufacturing of sandbags. Shape, colour, locking metl1od and size vaty bu t the 
filling volume and weight are more or less never exceeding what is manageable for 
one person. The flexibility of the sandbags gives possibility to a great di versity of 
wall constructions . In addition to this scope ofuse, are sandbags assiduously being 
taking advantage ofwithin EOD. 
I t is a personnel-demanding work to accomplish !arge constructions . The relative 
finically filling metl1od is in it labour-consuming. By themselves and tagether are 
these needs of hug e workforces time stealing as we l!. It is not either possible to use 
machines to rectify this time loss or cut the number ofrequired persmmel. 
Furthetmore cannot all of the natural materials be used as filling. Larger materials 
can ' t quite simply fit into the sandbag. It must also be mouldable. 
Fig. 12 Minor wall s of sandbags 
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4.4.4 Embankment 
Embankment is lastlya fourth alternative in building physical protection. This is also 
the simplest constmction. The only thing needed is masses. It can be erected by hand 
and/or by the hel p of machines. Furthermore an embankment, if time is essential , 
doesn't require any particular major preparations. 
Fig. 13 Embankment around small compound 
Embankments however are, especially in the Iong te1m, constmction sensitivity to 
weather. The lack of holders for the masses gives p lanatian from wind, rain and snow 
plenty of room for manoeuvre. Moreover eauses this, which is a result of the 
constmction idea itself that mo re mass is demanded to accomplish the same 
protection than the other solutions. Its simplicity is al so its Achilles' heel. Depending 
on the need of the size of the angle of repase ma y the embankment i nerease even 
more. A !arge base becomes a necessity to reach sufficient height. 
4.4.5 Filled container 
As a perimeter containers can be filled completely and put as a ring, either in one 
layer or two stacked layers on top of each other around the compound. An altemative 
is to put them 90 degrees up and gain altitude for the perimeter protection. As a 
shelter they can be reinforced on the outside with sand bags or Hesco Bastion for 
example. Reinforcement can altematively be done on the inside with sand bags or the 
container gets a seeond wall and the air-gap between the walls is filled with masses. 
A third way to use i t as a shelter is to dig i t down and then cover i t with masses (there 
must be reinforcement don e or el se w iii the container's ro of implode of the weight. A 
easy way is to tum it upside-down.) 
4.4.6 Existing buildings 
The use of existing buildings could be a time sa ving solution. This solution could also 
meanlittle requirement of the necessity of own building efforts. The protection (the 
wall s and ro of for instance) is already in place. On the other hand are the i r statuses 
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unknown and i t could be difficult to judge their protective capacity. A building could 
therefore be needed to reinforce totallyor partly. Other aspects are their earthquake 
resistance capability and fire resistance. Levels of mould and radon should al so be 
taken into consideration. 
Fig. 14 Existing tower of clay 
4.5 Other 
A closely related scope of solutions is worth mentioning even thou i t has a limited 
use with in the actual field of discussion. I t is the movable physical protection 
solutions for reissued use with comparatively short time for fettle4• Often arethese 
solutions relying on steel or ceramic as the protective material. 
4.6 Combinations 
To obtain a satisfactorily all round physical protection is often a combination of 
various solutions a necessity as different solutions proteet against different threats . 
Threats occur out-of-hours, separately or, in the worst case, all at the same time at the 
same target 
The threat assessment that is conducted in the planning phase to detem1ine the actual 
tirreats i. e. minimize the number and more important; give the right background for 
adequate protection measurements, is highly unlikely to produce only one threat, a 
palette of threats is more like ly. 
An altemative to erect a combination of protection solutions to face a multifacered 
cumulated tirreat is to ad just the protection solution according to the change of tlu·eat. 
4 FOI , Flyttbara skydd mot vapenverkan, 2005 
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This means a eonstant building and rebuilding process. This is not acquiescently or 
desirably, whether practically, organizationally or as a methodology. The physical 
protection would most Iikely fail, how knows when one threat stops and another 
begin, exactly? A c01nbination is preferable. 
The perimeter protection is common! y built up of three parts where theirs 
respectively protective functions tagether eonstirute the perimeter protection. 
Variations prevail in infinity. A mesh net in the front, or outennost, thenano man 
land and finally a wall construction. The mesh net is used with the purpose of 
protection from wrregulated actmission to the camp. The no man land is to create a 
distance, between potential tirreats and the personneJ and materiel on the camp, in 
order to have a s pace of total contro l around the camp and thereby get ear! y warning 
andreaction time for countem1easures. Furthennore helps the distance to minimize 
the impact of an executed threat, for example to aggravate for an enemy who is 
throwing explosives or hand grenades to reach the camp. The wall construction 
finally stops the threats. 
Fence Ditch Wall 
Fig. 15 Example of combinations for perimeter protection 
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5 Quick Response Cell System 
Below is a smorgasbord of questions that need to be emphasized in the process of 
creating physical protection for the extent of a camp's fortification and serves as a 
background for the context of the use of QRCS: 
Tlu·eat assessments in order to determine types , metl1ods and intensity of 
tirreats in the local area of the future camp. 
Acceptance of loss. There will always be a risk of losses , either darna g ed 
equipment, partly or completely and/or personal injuries or at worst loss of 
Iife. The physical protection reduces the prohability of risk of hann of an 
executed threat to an acceptable leve l of loss. 
The above-mentioned questions lead to the protection requirements, w hi ch 
fonn the b ase for the dimensioning of the protection constructions. 
Foreseeable and expected enlm·gements. This must be taken in to 
consideration in order to minimize any interference the additional 
construction work could have on the ongoing operation and activities in situ. 
Fmther, is it unnecessary to have to demolish already existing constructions 
and create vulnerable openings in the protection. 
Available time for building. Different solutionstake different time to erect. 
Transportatian options: by land, by sea or by air? Regarding both capacity 
limitations ofweight and volwne but also transportation time. 
A vailable local resources such as building material, construction machines 
and equipment, which could mean give a solution not possibly otherwise. 
Different threats, needs and possibilities in combination give different solutions . 
5.1 Concept 
Main construction idea of the QRCS is easiest described as an accordion-like 
assembly of sewed to gether o pen cells in p lastic fibre cloth. 
5.2 Technical specification 
Two models will be described in depth , one Ja~·ger and one smaller. 
5.2.1 Larger mode! 
The larger mode! is a self-standing cmmective structure of five cells. The cells are 
one by one by one metre. The mode! is self-standing thanks to that in every seeond 
cell are an inner hard p lastic conugated card board, w h ich is of the same material as 
the cells themselves. It is transport ed folded. This prototype is refen·ed to as P l. The 
weight of one P l (five cells) is approximately 4 kg. 
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Fig. 16 Two rows of PI filled and puttagether 
Fig. 17 PI folded tagether (can ofCoca Cola 330 mi for comparison) 
5.2.2 Smaller model 
The smaller mode! consist of nvo meter Iong, half a metre wide divided in four cells, 
half a metre Iong each. The mode! is Iransported folded. It can be folded further; i t 
can be balled due to that i t on! y consists of soft materials . This prototype is refeiTed 
to as P2 . The weight of one P2 (four cells) is approximately l kg. 
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Fig. 18 Two rows ofP2 filled and stacked on each other 
F i g. 19 P2 folded to gether (can of Coca Cola 330 mi for comparison) 
5.3 Material5'6'7 
The name plastic is originated from Greek plassein and means loosely translated "to 
fom1". Plastic getsit characteristics from the constituent polymer. The word polymer 
means "many parts" (from Greek poly = many and meros = part). 
5.3.1 Plastic in QRCS 
Polypropylene (PP) is a linear hydraearbon polymer, expressed, as CnH2n. PP is one 
of those most all-round polymers available for all kind of end-users. The combination 
of material prope1iies f o und in PP is unique compared to an y other thermoplastic. 
Among other prope11ies PP has good chemical resistance, i t is tough, has good fatigue 
5 Burström, 2001 
6 www.bpf.co.uk 
7 
www.sdplatstics.com 
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and heat resistance (a big bag ofPP can be filled with matetial that is 100 degrees 
Celsius wann). Other applications ofPP (big bags) are used several times before they 
are recycled. Futthennare has PP low weight and moisture absorption rate. PP 
withstands intensive direct sunlight during a Iong time span, arout1d two years. 
Regarding outdoor temperature, PP can be used between minus 50 degrees Celsius up 
to 50 degrees Celsius. 
5.4 Manufacturing 
5.4.1 Selection 
The first contact with a big bag product was a product used for collecting recycled 
building material in Stockholm. The company, BIG BAG (www.bigbag.nu), was 
contacted. The company had no own manufacturing or sale. Their supplier was the 
manufacturing company Codefine (wwvv.codefine.ch). 
To be able to conduct a more profound exposition and get a better understanding of 
the packaging and especially the big bag industry Sean Pack 2006 was visited. This is 
the Scandinavia ' s biggest packaging fair. It washeldat the Swedish exhibition centre 
in Gothenburg, Sweden. It took place 241h- 2ih October 2006. The visit gave that 
there were four possible campanies to work with i.e . to get a prototype made: 
- Accon, www.accon.no or W\vw.accon.se, a Norwegian supplier ofpaper and plastic 
packaging. Only sale, no own manufacturing. 
- Certex, W\Vw.certex.se, a Swedish company belonging to Axel Johnson 
Intemational (www.axinter.se), which is a group company within Axel Jolmson 
(www.axeljohnson.se). The main products are their range of steel wire rope and 
lifting tools with the big bag as a sideline product. Only sale, no own manufacturing. 
- Procudan, www.procudan.dk, a Danish supplier ofpaper and plastic packaging. 
Only sale, no own manufacturing. 
- Codefine, a Swiss company with its own construction and development section and 
own manufacturing oftheir products. 
The basic construction idea of QRCS is a row of connective bags. None of the 
competitors had warked with this kind of bags. In order to be able to manufacture 
QRCS the company has to have a capability to either adjust or change a productian 
Iine or to use manual productian settings. Codefine was the only competitor that 
could offer this . Codefine was chosen. 
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5.4.2 Company presentation8 
Codefme is an intemational trading and manufacturing company. It is present 
worldwide in barter trades, carpet, textile and packaging industries . 
Their market spans in more than 50 countries around the glo be. The company was 
founded in 1959. Codefine's head office is based in a Lausarme, Switzerland. The 
company is represented in Sweden. The company is completely self-financed. 
Codefine has approxamitaly 2000 employees diveded on three productian and 
manufacturing centers which are located in Turkey, lndia, Hungary. Salesofficesand 
representatives are located around the world. 
The products meets the ISO 900 l : 2000 certification standard. Bags are futhermore 
testedfor hazardous materials, according to UN Regulations. The Conunittee of 
Experts on the Transport ofDangerous Goods of the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council issues Mode! Regulations on the Transportatian ofDangerous Goods. 
5.5 Advantages of the QRCS 
5.5.1 User friendly 
For the first it is very easy to use - it is obvious how to handie and easy to bring -
with its easy-to-use-concept and low weight (no 'big muscles ' needed) everyone can 
handie and work with QRCS. Filling is possible both by hand and/or with machine. 
No preparations either action or time are necessary, QRCS is possible to use directly. 
5.5.2 Good logistic 
The low weight and low volume give excellent logistic. Youwill be able to transport 
more protection per every transp01ted unit ofweight and volwne, which is crucial 
when logistics are a limiting factor. As an example it will be possible to bring 
approximately 2000 rurming me tres of P l in a 20' container. 
5.5.3 No extra needs 
QRCS doesn ' t need any extra equipment to be erected. PI is furthennore self-
standing in itself. Every seeond cell is reinforced with extra irmer corrugated plastic 
cardboardsalong its vertical sides. The purpose ofP2 and P3 is to be able to ball 
them, w hy they will not be equipped with the stiffening cardboards. If the cardboards 
are rem o ved from the P l , i t will weigh even less and use even less volume. (The 
cardboards are made of the same plastic material as the rest of the QRCS.) 
8 ww w.codefine.ch 
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5.5.4 Low price 
QRCS is a tear and wear product. Bring it, use it, leave it. The low cost makes it 
affordable for eve1yday use for all. The cost per P l is 860 SEK and per P2 is 390 
SEK. Regardless, the cost is not a limiting factor for supplying potential end-users in 
general in the field or for a commanding officer to give order of increased protection 
or not depending on the cost of the protection as it could be for example when using 
HESCO Bastion or building construction out of reinforced concrete. 
5.5.5 Multifunctional 
The QRCS is the most multifunctional tempormy protection system in any 
comparison tha1lks to its endless ways of sizes, lengths, the amount and colours 
available. It is custom made already from the start. In a nutshell ; it ' s the customers 
fantasy that gives the limits. 
QRCS is ideal for temporary needs. I t could be as perimeter protection of a Forward 
Operating Base (FOB) or a minor compound when building a permanent camp. 
Others could be occasional reinforcement of reconstructions of pennan en t protection 
or to cover for a destroyed part due to an attack. But also during EOD and at 
tempormy checkpoints. 
5.5.6 Simple 
The simplicity of QRCS is another advantage in itself. Despite solution, i t will 
require educated and trained personnel. The solution must be manageable in a harsh 
and unfriendly environment as an operational theatre could be. The more 
sophisticated a solution is , the more exclusive it will get: in an organisation fewer 
employees will be educated, even fewer will be adequate trained over tin1e and when 
i t is time to go abroad and do it, there will be even fewer due to family related issues, 
pers01mel have changed duties or left . When the capability is unique, the 
commanding officer will be more reluctant to give the order to use i t than in 
comparison to a solution that is wide spread and could be executed by the majority. 
QRCS is a solution of the latter sort. 
5.5.7 Environmental friendly 
QRCS is environmental friendly in many perspectives. The low weight and volume 
give a low envirom11ental impact during transporration compared to heavier solutions . 
The manufacturing requires only one mate1ial. At disposal of a used QRCS there will 
only be water and earbon dioxide remaining i.e. no transportatians ofwaste material 
1s necessa1y. 
The above-described advantages give together a product for tempora1y physical 
protection solution not onthemarket today. QRCS is the choice. 
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5.6 Disadvantages of the QRCS 
QRCS needs to be filled slightly slowly in order for the user to flatten the filling 
material gradually. The filling material needs to be put centred in the cells in order to 
avoid the cells to overtum. Due to the material of the QRCS the cells will slu·ink a 
little bit in height. 
5. 7 How to pay for all 
In order to be able to go from idea to a real product for full scale live testing the 
author applied for a scholarship, see appendix II (Swedish text) , at the Fortification 
corps' foundation for development and was awarded a scholarship of 17,000 SEK. 
The tests themselves have been done in cooperation with the Swedish An11ed Forces . 
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6 Empirics 
The path from idea to product was conducted, sunm1arized in six short steps: 
l. A need was identified, 
2. An idea was bom, 
3. A prototype was made, 
4. The prototype evaluated, 
5. Second prototypes were made, 
6. Field-test. 
The field-test was conducted in tvvo steps. A first test for practical matters as handling 
and filling. The seeond was concentrating on the ability to withstand threats . 
Thou the background of the QRCS has been presented earlier, the chapters that will 
come will concentrate on step three and forward. 
6.1 First prototype 
The first prototype was mainly made to see if the idea was possible at all to get 
realized. The purpose was further, if this became a reality, at presentations to use the 
prototype as a tool to visualize the idea and as a "hands on" for the audience. 
The prototype consists of a connective row of five cells, by one by one by one metres 
i.e. on e cubic me tre each, and is made of a thin cloth of p lastic fibrous tissue. 
Duting early 2007 the prototype and the idea itselfwas presentedat several occasions 
for different people in order to get feedback, emuments for a possible next step and if 
so, improvements on the solution of QRCS, see appendix I for details. For the more 
fonnal presentations an overhead slide as well a power point presentation was 
produced, see appendix III (Swedish text). The results of these meetings with 
constructive discussions were the seeond round of prototypes. 
6.2 seeond prototypes 
The inputs , both pros and eons, and reconm1endations that emerged from the 
presentations of the first prototype were, among others the advantage ofthe material ; 
lighnveight and with the possibility to havetailormade (if wanted) sizes and shapes. 
Questions rose were for instance how easy it is to use, the endurance for long time 
storage, price and its resistance against ultravioler light. 
The outcome of the meetings was analyzed and suggestions of new prototypes were 
developed. The se we re p ut forward to the manufacturer for evaluation of their 
realizability, both concerning technical, the product itself and how to make i t, as well 
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as economical aspects ; for instance, the more detailing that is desired, the more 
expensive it will get. 
In addition to the presenred two sizes ofQRCS, a third prototype (named P3) was 
manufactured: two metres Iong, half a metre wide as one cell for easy filling from 
truck or wheel loader. Fmthermore has P3 loops attached in the comers for 
machinety handling. This means that as an altemative, P3 will be able to fillin a 
quarTy for instance and then transpm·ted to the actual building site (instead of 
bringing the filling material to building site and fill the QRCS on site). 
6.3 Practical test 
6.3.1 Aim 
The main goal was to ensure the vety bas i c capability of the QRCS; the capability to 
withhold the filling material itself. The first test was also aiming to evaluate practical 
filling methods , possible and preferable, and considerations. 
6.3.2 Where and when 
The practical test was conducred with the help of the construction company Sjöbo 
Anläggning, Maskin och Asfalt AB in Sjöbo, Sweden the 23'd of October 2007. 
6.3.3 Execution 
The QRCS was handled by hand by two labours. Filling was done with machine, a 
tractor digger with the support of the two labours. On! y one set-up was made and 
only one fillingin order to save the other prototypes for ftuther destruction test. P l 
and P3 were used. 
F i g. 20 Filling of P l for the first time 
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6.4 Destruction test 
6.4.1 Aim 
To evaluate the capability and performance of the QRCS for different threats by 
using full-seale destruction test with live ammunition. 
6.4.2 Where and when 
The destruction test was conducted at the Swedish EOD and Demining Centre, 
SWEDEC, SAF, in Eksjö, Sweden the l51h ofMay 2008. 
6.4.3 Execution 
The QRCS was handie by hand by two labours. Filling was done with machine, a 
tractor digger with the suppmi of the two labours. One set-up at the time was 
constructed, rigg ed and executed. In total six (6) set-ups were conducted. P l and P2 
were used. 
6.4.4 Ammunition 
Three different ammunition types were used in the test: the Swedish 155 mm atiillery 
shell, the Swedish l 05 nm1 atiillery shell and the Swedish m/56 hand grenade. 
The atiillery shells were placed standing on the ground on the bottom (please see 
pictures below) in order to atTange repeatable conditions for the set-ups. The hand 
grenade has prefom1ed fragments . 
The length in millimetre mentioned a bo ve is the calibre of the she Il, which is the 
diameter of the projectile. The abbreviation m/56 stands for mode! 1956. 
The 155 mm shell contains roughly seven kilogram of high explosive9, the 105 mm 
correspondingly less. The hand grenade contains 190 grams of high explosive and has 
prefmmed fragments 10 • 
9 www.soldf.com 
10 www.soldf.com 
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6.4.5 Set-up 1 
Set-up l consists of a wall oft\vo plus one size P l. A 155 mm artillery grenade is 
placed five metres away. The targets are located two meters behind the wall. 
Targets QRCS Grenade 
9 • l l l l :2m • l t 
View side 
• 5m 
2m 2m 5m ~-------~-------~-------------------------~ 
View above 
Fig. 21 Sketch of Set-up l 
Fig. 22 Set-up l seen from the side 
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6.4.6 Set-up 2 
Set-up 2 consists of a wall of tvi o plus on e size P l . A 155 1m11 artillery grenade is 
placed on top of the lower row. The targets are located two meters behind the wall. 
Targets QRCS Grenade y/ 
_l 
View side 
• 
2m 2m 
~------~------~ 
View above 
Fig. 23 Sketch of Set-up 2 
Fig. 24 View of the grenade 
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6.4.7 Set-up 3 
Set-up 3 consists of a wall ofone plus one size PI. A 105 mm artillery grenade is 
placed five straight to the wall. The targets are located two meters behind the wall. 
Tarqets QRCS Grenade 
View side 
2m 1m ·-------...-~ 
View above 
Fig. 25 Sketch of Set-up 3 
Fig. 26 The wall and grenade in place, targets are to be placed 
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6.4.8 Set-up 4 
Set-up 4 consists of a wall of on e plus on e size P l. A l 05 nm1 artillery grenade is 
placed straight to the same wall used in Set-up 3. The targets are located two meters 
behind the wall . 
Targets QRCS Grenade 
View side 
2m 1m 
.--------..-~ 
View above 
Fig. 27 Sketch of Set-up 4 
Fig. 28 The grenade is located slightly to the right of the centre 
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6.4.9 Set-up 5 
Set-up 5 consists of a wall of one plus one size P2 . A hand grenade is placed straight 
to the wall. The target is located one meter behind the wall. 
Target QRCS Grenade 
View side 
1 m 0,5 m 
·------..--~ 
View above 
Fig. 29 Sketch of Set-up 5 
Fig. 30 The hand grenade in place just in front of the QRCS 
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6.4.1 O Set-up 6 
Set-up 6 consists of a wall of one plus one size P2. Four hand grenades are placed 
straight to the wall. (Which is the same that was used in Set-up 5). The target is 
located one meter behind the wall. 
Tarqet QRCS 
View side 
1m 0,5 m 
·------..--· 
View above 
Fig. 31 Sketch of Set-up 6 
Grenades 
.. 
l 
l 
:1m 
l 
• 
.. 
l 
l 
l 
l 
l 
:2m 
l 
l 
l 
l 
l 
l 
l 
• 
Fig. 32 The four hand grenades are not placed (in front of each of the cells) , b ut this 
is the only pi c ture taken of the wall before the detonation of Set-up 6 
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7 Results 
All the results are described respectively with pictures and corresponding text. The 
practical test executed in Sjöbo is presentedin chapter 7.1 and the destruction test 
done in Eksjö in chapter 7.2 with pictures showing the differentset-upsafter the 
detonations . 
7.1 Practical test 
Here was the QRCS for the first time filled . A slightly wet sandy soil filling material 
was used. The P l as shown below holds together. Erection time for filling P l 
complete was 24 minutes. 
Fig. 33 P l holdstagether 
The P3 was filled with the same material but collapsed during filling. The failure is 
due to a wrongly done construction of the one cell with no joining bel t or similar in 
the middle. 
Fig. 34 P3 collapsed 
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7.2 Destruction test 
All six threats of the set-ups were successfully executed and detonated according to 
plan. Erection time of filling P l complete was in average 20 min u tes . Erection time 
of fillin g P2 was not measured. 
In all of the six set-ups non e of the targets were penetratedor perforated. 
7.2.1 Set-up 1 
The blast gav e ho les along the front side of the wall of the QRCS from the splinters 
from the she!!. They did not cause any serve damage to the QRCS, only smaller holes 
could be found. Thereby the wall itself was still in place and its purpose valid. 
Fig. 35 Result of the artille1y shell from five meters 
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7.2.2 Set-up 2 
With a shell directly placedon the wall, in the middle, the effect will obviously be 
more profow1d campared with the tlu·eat in set-up l. But still the wall is only Jocally 
demolished at the Jocation of the artillery shell a Iong the upper leve l. The full lo w er 
leve! of QRCS is still standing and as can be seen on the pi c ture below even the t'No 
cells on the sides of the upper Jevel are standing, with some damages. 
Fig. 36 The wall from behind 
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7.2.3 Set-up 3 
The P l as seen on the pi c ture below were stackable directly on to p of each other, not 
only as in set-up l and 2 where there were one row on top oft\vo lower rows . The 
wall in set-up 3 was stable and the blast on.ly gave real damage to the clasest upper 
cells. Even so, halfofthe filling material in front ofthe shell in the top row remains. 
Fig. 37 The wall seen from the front side 
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7 .2.4 Set-up 4 
The seeond shell al o ng the same wall worsen the dam a ges of the wall so even the 
upper cells on the sides where tom open on the front side. B ut as seen in the picture 
bel o w, there is still fillin g material remaining in all of the upper cells. The lower is 
more or less intact. 
Fig. 38 There is still no perforations of the wall after the seeond artillery shell along 
the same wall 
43 
7.2.5 Set-up 5 
The blast and the fragments didn ' t make the wall of the P2 collapse. Just in the 
middle, in the front of the hand grenade, the upper two cells have started slightly to 
tip forward. This is due to the lower tvvo cells have burst open and the filling material 
from these has spilied out and left the upper cells with a weakened base forthem to 
stand on. 
Fig. 39 The wall from the front side 
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7.2.6 Set-up 6 
The same wall as in set-up 5 has been used. The upper leve) has suffered from the 
four hand grenades, while the lower is more or less intact. But there is still filling 
material in place in all of the cells. 
Fig. 40 The wall seen from the side with the front side to the right 
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8 Analyse 
The analyse covers both the practical test as weil as the destruction test. The different 
sizes of QRCS and their respectively perfonnances are discussed conunonly below. 
The absence of mo re teclmical documentation equipment d urin g the destruction tests, 
for example high-speed cameras, i t is unknown how the QRCS is behaving more in 
detail during impact ofboth the fragmentation and shock wave. With the 
documentation equipment used at the tests within this Master thesis , still camera and 
visual observation it is thou possible to dete1mine how the whole protection solution, 
QRCS filled with grave! worked. 
The P3 collapsed due to wrongly design with no stabilizing construction in the 
middle. lt was thereby not taken to the next step of destruction tes ting. 
8.1 Workable 
At the practical test the QRCS was used for the first time and for a seeond time at the 
destruction test. Different persmmel were involved at the different testing occasions. 
No one bad seen QRCS before or bad had any education before the tests . The author 
was the on! y person patiicipating in both of the tests. Fmihetmore were the pers mm el 
not teamed up until the tests and consequently not trained together. 
Despite these conditions the work went very weil. The work with filling the QRCS 
and building the walls succeeded already the first time. QRCS needs to be filled 
slowly and for best result, around one quarter in each of the cells first , continued by 
filling even! y a little at a time. The filling time was l owered justaftera few times. 
The tests showed that there is a low need of education. Proper training and repeated 
training of pers mm el and m1its w iii of cours e improve the result and are 
reconunended, but instead ofnothing, QRCS can be used itru11ediately with a 'good 
enough ' res u l t. Compared for instance with protective construction of concrete, 
QRCS can be used by everyone evetywhere without any special education. For an 
organisation, like an mmed force, this means that i t can obtain a protective capacity 
rather easily and keep i t but also having persmmel en masse trained. 
No special or extra equipment or tools were used or for that part required. The QRCS 
can be cut, ifwished, with an ordinary knife, which is a part of a soldier' s basic kit. 
The low weight of the QRCS gave goodhandling oppmilini ty manuall y on the 
working site. lt was easy to can·y around. HESCO Bastion that is heavy requires 
machinety handling, which with the QRCS instead can be used for other tasks . 
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The low weight together with the small volume gave that i t was possible to transport 
45 me tres of P l and 20 metres of P2 in an ordinary station wagon, with the backsea t 
tilted. There was still empty space, but with no further QRCS to stack, i t is unclear 
how much more that would have been able to bring in the ear. 
8.2 Stackable 
QRCS is stackable. In construction i t is both possible to stack the l arg er (P l) as weil 
the smaller (P2). P l can be stacked either as a 'two plus one' or 'one plus one' i.e. 
two rows of QRCS at the base with one row on top or with just one row at the base 
with one row on top. P2 can bestackedas a 'one plus one'. Combinations are also 
possible with P l as the bas e with either P2 direct on top of i t or another ro w of P l 
first , that is topped with the P2. QRCS is also possible to stack when stored. The 
folded P l , P2 and P3 can be stack ed on to p of each other. 
As other gabion system, such as HESCO Bastion for instance, QRCS is using the 
filling material effectively to form a protective wall. There is no mmecessmy filling 
material needed like in an embankment to create the protection. 
8.3 Withstands the threats 
The QRCS withstands the threats . QRCS get affected, damaged or even in some parts 
destroyed, bu t i t is locally. Of course, the worst-case scenario with a 155 mm shell 
straight into the wall will result in a large destruction zone, but even so, the full base 
of two rows are still in place and the ou ter cells of the to p ro w are still standing, thou 
affected. This means for the defenders that they still have protection in place and can 
establish tempm·my battle positions along the wall. The standing remains means also 
that vehicles are stopped from an easy entering of the compound and units on foot 
need to climb and expose themselves . Furthetmore, the QRCS didn ' t catch fire in any 
of the set-ups. 
The QRCS shows good capability to withstand fragmentation. The material has a 
high leve l of t ear resistance. This means that the fragments even if they perfora te the 
plastic, do not disabled the protection. The p lastic holds together, even if there are 
smaller and larger holes, so the filling matetial remains in place. When the threat is 
close, the shock wave tears the QRCS apart locally on the front side i.e. the side 
against the threat, but the plastic holds still together on the backside. 
8.4 Proteets 
All targets i.e. protected persmmel, were milianned and would have survived. They 
were of course dirty from the thrown out filling material in set-up 2. There could also 
have been minor injuries on examples the eardrum from the detonation itself, but 
their Iife would have been spared. 
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9 Conclusions 
An idea developed into a real product has been presented. The QRCS withstands a 
range of common threats. The QRCS is workable, both manually as weil with 
machinery filling. l t is possible to erect the needed Jar·ger walls for perimeter 
protection, at a camp for instance. It is lightweight and easy to use. Erection is done 
quickly. The ambition ofuser friendliness and simplicity has been reached. 
The QRCS gives a new complementarily physical solution with advantages such as 
little requirements of education and training and there is no need for an y extra special 
equipment or tools. QRCS has smalllogistic requisites. Furthennore will there be an 
enviromnental friendly zero footprint when winding up a (temperar)') construction of 
QRCS compared to other solutions used today. 
QRCS combines the advantages of a gabion, filling an open big cage, and its 
protective strength with the lightness of the plastic material of a sand bag. QRCS 
forms a physical protection system for the future. QRCS meets the demands of easy 
to use, light to transport and cheap to buy. But above all QRCS gives physical 
protection - the objective is reached. 
1 O Discussions 
10.1 Future 
The global need of physical protection is today hug e du e to the great number of 
intemational militar')' operations. For example are today around 150.000 foreign 
troops stationed in Afghanistan 11 • Fast establishment of force protection for rapid 
deployment militat')' forces, minimize collateral damage, protection of civilian and 
civilian infrastructure are all example of the same thing; someone in need of physical 
protection. To a low cost with easy-handling and goodlogistic products. QRCS can 
fill this gap. 
Other possible stakeholders are campanies and organisations working in unstable 
countries. They could for instance be Non Govermnental Organisations (NGO), 
Govemmental Organisations (GO) or Oil companies. 
10.2 Next step 
In order to leam more about the construction and to be able to improve the QRCS one 
should carry out enlarged destruction test and after that put the modified prototypes 
on the field for live tr')'-OUts with training military fonnations as an ordinary part of 
the units' equipment. The test should also include fire resistance of the plastic. 
11 Svenska Dagbladet, sid 16 
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12 Appendices 
Appendix l - Development 
A first meeting was heJd with Mr Ingvar Anglevik at the today abalished Military 
facility office in Stockholm within the Headquatiers of the Swedish Anned Forcesin 
late January 2007. The discussion circled around the idea as such, engineering 
aspects of ballistic protection and ethical and environmental friendly issues. 
The seeond meeting was heJd with the development sections of the Engineering 
School at the Engineer Regiment and the Swedish Demining and EOD Centre in 
Eksjö, Sweden in late Jatmary 2007. Participating were Major Sandh, Captain 
Emfridsson, Major Malmberg and Captain Johansson. The meeting deal t with 
militaty engineering aspects, teclmical specifications and demands of a product like 
QRCS, stora ge capacity and possible areas of interest for the QRCS. 
The QRCS was shown and discussed with Lieutenant-colonel Hellsten from the 
fom1er Civil Engineering's corps within the Swedish Anned Forcesand Lieutenant-
colonel Schalling from the Headquatiers of the Swedish Anned Forcesin different 
Jocations in Stockholm, Sweden separately, during Jarmary to March 2007. The 
discussions focused on the handling aspects for a military end-user of the QRCS. 
During later spring 2007 the author bad meetings with representative from Ideon in 
Lund, Sweden regar·ding the possibility to apply for patent for the QRCS. The 
outcome was that it is a Iong and complicated process that will not fit in to the time 
fram e of a Master thesis. The process was continued by Codefine in 20 l O and a 
patent is now pending. 
As weil during the later of spring 2007 the a utbor had an ongoing discussion with 
Johan Stavenow at Codefine with the purpose to modify the first prototype to get a 
realistic approach ofpossible improvements recommended andasked for during 
earlier meetings according the above-mentioned meetings. 
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Appendix Il- Application 
Ansökan om stipendium 
Mitt namn Anders Persson och jag har en ide som jag skulle vilja förverkliga . 
Jag är studerande på civilingenjörsprogratm11et väg och vatten vid Lunds Tekniska 
Högskola där jag nu skall slutföra mina studier och genomföra mitt examensarbete. 
Vidare är jag reservofficer med utbildning och utiandstjänstgöring inom 
ammunitions- och minröjning (EOD) samt militärt och civilt ingenjörsarbete. 
I mars 2006 komjag hem efter nästa ett års närvaro i Afghanistan. Där bestod min 
tjänst av att jag inledningsvis ledde och koordinerade den intemationella 
militärstyrkans EOD-resurser i Kabul. I samband med detta kom jag i kontakt med 
och involverades i Sveriges planering av byggnation av en ny camp i Mazar-i-Sharif i 
norra Afghanistan. Jag blev tillfrågad och jag tackade ja till att efter genomförd tjänst 
fortsätta i projektet där jag sedan var biträdande byggledare. Arbetet var mycket 
intressant och utvecklande. Iden föddes under detta arbete. 
Vad jag vill uppnå är att öka fysisk säkerhet snabbt för personal i ett insats område. 
Det ska vara kostnadseffektivt och transportekonomiskt Min ide är att använda 
dragspelssammansydda öppna celler i plastfiberväv som behållare får grus , kross, etc. 
Exempelvis vid den inledande fasen av en campetablering kan man uppnå både 
visuellt skydd och skydd mot direktriktad eld. Även enklare skyddsställningar kan 
framställas för att minska skadeverkan av indirekt eld. Min ide går också att ta med 
sig på patrulluppdrag i fordon som möjliggör upprättandet av fårstärkta tillfälliga 
posteringar. Återställningsarbetet är på samma sätt smidigt. 
Under fåna året kontaktades ett företag som tillverkade en första prototyp. Iden har 
presenterats för bl a FM (Ing2/SWEDEC). En förfrågan om modifierad prototyp (tre 
olika får att möta de möjliga behov som framkom) har skickats till 
tillverkningsföretaget Föna veckan angav de slutligen prisnivåema för dessa . 
Min avsikt är att genomföra fälttest med fokus på hanterbarhet och skydd. För detta 
behövs det en kortare serie av prototyper, för vilka kostnaden preliminärt beräknas till 
17 000 SEK. Det är för detta som jag söker stipendium hos Er. 
Jag är tacksam för möjligheten att få ansöka hos Er och ser fram emot Et1 svar. 
Med vänlig hälsning 
Anders Persson 
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Appendix III- Power point presentation 
Quick Response Bag System 
Agenda 
• Om mig 
Bakgrund 
Anders Persson 
2007 
• situationen idag 
• Min ide 
• Prototyp 
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• FS10 21C CEO, Mazar-e-Sharif 
FS09 C MN EOD CC, Kabul 
• FS06 CO PROJ, MN CIMIC CC, Kabul 
KS03 EOD GrpC, Kosove 
• P7: G9 LNO 
OHS, ROK5 vid FArbS, Eksjö 
Civ ing VoV, Lunds universitet 
• Dykning, fallskärmshoppning, löpning 
• Syfte med konstruktion (till vad. mot vad, korttlång tid) 
• Kunskap/utb, utrustning, personal, material 
• Tiden för uppförande - kritisk faktor 
Vikten- begränsande faktor (flyg, hkp, tgfd, ... ) 
• Kostnad, organisation samt lösning (bomb KAlA) 
• Fysiskt skydd svårt att uppnå vid 
Iong range patrol (MOT). 
tillfällig camp/postering (EN i MeS). 
• snabbt förändrat läge (nytt hot just nu, Muhammedteckningar) 
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• Vanligt förekommande typer av skydd: 
• Sandsäckar är små, för att uppnå skydd behövs många. De tar 
lång tid att färdigställa då flera arbetsmoment och finlir måste till. 
Personalkrävande. 
Hesco Bastions är tunga, är "för bra" ibland, med en levnadstid 
på flera år. Dyra. Nödvändigt med maskinhantering för transport. 
Betongkonstruktioner motsvarande kräver specifik kunskap, 
särskild material och utrustning. Dessa har både hög vikt och 
volym. Tidskrävande. 
Uppskottade jordvallar är instabila då regn, snö och vind ger 
erodering. Blir stora för att få fullgott skydd även i toppen. 
• Temporär skyddshöjande byggnation 
• Ett komplement till dagens funktionslösningar 
• Dragspelssammansvetsade/kopplade öppna celler i plastfiberväv 
med hel botten samt med handtag på sidorna. l botten finns det 
hål för dränering. 
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• Mål: enkel, snabb och lätt 
• Billig (både gällande tillverkning och material) 
Lätt- och snabbanvänd ("självklar", kniven skall räcka) 
Låg vikt och liten volym, transportekonomisk (flyg), få plats i fordon 
Tålig konstruktion (fältmässig, inge förtroende hos användare) 
• Låg till obefintlig addering av material som sekundärsplitter 
Könsneutral 
• Miljövänlig 
• Volym: 5*1 *1 (fem celler ä 1 m3) 
• Vikt: 4 kilo 
• Förändringsmöjligheter: 
Vävens densitet (styvhet) 
• Färg 
Antal och stortak på celler 
• Sömmar/uppdelning oklart - avgörande? 
Utveckling: 
Ihopsättningsmekanism 
• Hantering 
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e g 
• Er feedback idag + modifierad prototyp 
• Provserie - antai/B*H*L 
• Fälttest-möjligt att testa kontra troliga hot 
Direkt eld (fin/grovkalibrig) 
• Splitter (OXA, mina, handgranat) 
Tryckvåg (OXA, mina, enstaka laddning, olika vikt) 
Brand (eld, napalm, molotov) 
• Datum 
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